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ABSTRACT
Background
Little is known about the long-term drug costs associated with treating AIDS in developing countries.
Brazil’s AIDS treatment program has been cited widely as the developing world’s largest and most
successful AIDS treatment program. The program guarantees free access to highly active antiretroviral
therapy (HAART) for all people living with HIV/AIDS in need of treatment. Brazil produces non-patented
generic antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), procures many patented ARVs with negotiated price reductions, and
recently issued a compulsory license to import one patented ARV. In this study, we investigate the drivers
of recent ARV cost trends in Brazil through analysis of drug-specific prices and expenditures between 2001
and 2005.
Methods and Findings
We compared Brazil’s ARV prices to those in other low- and middle-income countries. We analyzed
trends in drug expenditures for HAART in Brazil from 2001 to 2005 on the basis of cost data disaggregated
by each ARV purchased by the Brazilian program. We decomposed the overall changes in expenditures to
compare the relative impacts of changes in drug prices and drug purchase quantities. We also estimated
the excess costs attributable to the difference between prices for generics in Brazil and the lowest global
prices for these drugs. Finally, we estimated the savings attributable to Brazil’s reduced prices for patented
drugs. Negotiated drug prices in Brazil are lowest for patented ARVs for which generic competition is
emerging. In recent years, the prices for efavirenz and lopinavir–ritonavir (lopinavir/r) have been lower in
Brazil than in other middle-income countries. In contrast, the price of tenofovir is US$200 higher per
patient per year than that reported in other middle-income countries. Despite precipitous price declines
for four patented ARVs, total Brazilian drug expenditures doubled, to reach US$414 million in 2005. We
find that the major driver of cost increases was increased purchase quantities of six specific drugs:
patented lopinavir/r, efavirenz, tenofovir, atazanavir, enfuvirtide, and a locally produced generic, fixed-
dose combination of zidovudine and lamivudine (AZT/3TC). Because prices declined for many of the
patented drugs that constitute the largest share of drug costs, nearly the entire increase in overall drug
expenditures between 2001 and 2005 is attributable to increases in drug quantities. Had all drug
quantities been held constant from 2001 until 2005 (or for those drugs entering treatment guidelines after
2001, held constant between the year of introduction and 2005), total costs would have increased by only
an estimated US$7 million. We estimate that in the absence of price declines for patented drugs, Brazil
would have spent a cumulative total of US$2 billion on drugs for HAART between 2001 and 2005, implying
a savings of US$1.2 billion from price declines. Finally, in comparing Brazilian prices for locally produced
generic ARVs to the lowest international prices meeting global pharmaceutical quality standards, we find
that current prices for Brazil’s locally produced generics are generally much higher than corresponding
global prices, and note that these prices have risen in Brazil while declining globally. We estimate the
excess costs of Brazil’s locally produced generics totaled US$110 million from 2001 to 2005.
Conclusions
Despite Brazil’s more costly generic ARVs, the net result of ARV price changes has been a cost savings of
approximately US$1 billion since 2001. HAART costs have nevertheless risen steeply as Brazil has scaled up
treatment. These trends may foreshadow future AIDS treatment cost trends in other developing countries
as more people start treatment, AIDS patients live longer and move from first-line to second and third-line
treatment, AIDS treatment becomes more complex, generic competition emerges, and newer patented
drugs become available. The specific application of the Brazilian model to other countries will depend,
however, on the strength of their health systems, intellectual property regulations, epidemiological
profiles, AIDS treatment guidelines, and differing capacities to produce drugs locally.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that
globally, 2 million AIDS patients in developing countries were
receiving highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) in
December of 2006, a more than ﬁve-fold increase since 2001.
However, this number is only about 26% of the estimated 7.1
million people needing HAART [1]. Because large-scale
treatment began only recently in many developing countries,
little is known about the long-term costs of drugs for AIDS
treatment. Prices of many global ﬁrst-line antiretroviral drugs
(ARVs) recently declined precipitously with multinational
pharmaceutical companies’ tiered prices for low-, middle-,
and high-income countries and new generic competition for
ARVs [2]. However, even the lowest price—US$142 per
person per year (PPPY) for the ﬁrst-line HAART regimen—
reported to the WHO Global Price Reporting Mechanism
remains out of reach for many patients in resource-limited
settings. As patients receive HAART for longer periods, AIDS
case management becomes more complex and patients often
require more expensive second- and third-line ARVs. Also,
over time new ARVs have emerged, offering therapeutic
improvements with fewer pills. Although the prices of some
second-line ARVs have also declined in some countries,
second-line treatment is nearly always more expensive than
ﬁrst-line treatment because of the high costs associated with
developing new technologies and the monopoly prices
innovator companies enjoy during patent terms [2]. As
treatment scales up globally, many AIDS patients now
receiving ﬁrst-line therapies will need therapeutic alterna-
tives. The cost of second- and third-line AIDS treatment and
access to the latest ARV therapies is therefore a problem of
global public health concern.
Brazil, a middle-income country, has provided free and
universal access to HAART since 1996 but is grappling with
the rising cost of AIDS treatment. In Brazil, HAART is
recommended to symptomatic HIV-positive patients regard-
less of viral load counts and to asymptomatic patients with
CD4
þ T cell counts below 200/mm
3. HAART is considered for
asymptomatic patients with CD4
þ cell counts between 200/
mm
3 and 350/mm
3; decisions to start treatment are deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis. The total number of patients
receiving HAART has increased each year since 1997, with a
reported 180,000 of the estimated 600,000 HIV-infected
Brazilians receiving treatment in 2006 (Figure 1) (AIDS Care
and Treatment Department of the National STD and AIDS
Program of Brazil, personal communication) [3]. Over this
period, mother-to-child transmission of HIV declined; AIDS-
related hospitalizations, mortality, and morbidity declined;
and life expectancy of AIDS patients more than tripled from
an estimated 18 to 58 months [4–10]. Estimated AIDS
incidence has plateaued, particularly in southeastern Brazil,
the region with highest HIV prevalence [9,11]. Nonetheless,
the number of patients receiving HAART is likely to increase
as Brazil continues to expand treatment and patients live
longer.
The cost of AIDS treatment in Brazil has grown in recent
years as clinical, social, and political circumstances have
evolved. In the 1990s, Brazil’s Health Ministry began
producing generic ARVs locally. However, in 1997, Brazil,
which has the world’s tenth largest pharmaceutical industry
and a long history of public drug production, began to
recognize intellectual property protection for pharmaceut-
ical products. Patent legislation was adopted in Brazil much
earlier than the World Trade Organization (WTO) deadlines
of 2005 and 2016 for middle- and low-income countries [12–
14]. As a result, 11 of the 18 drugs in Brazil’s current
treatment guidelines are now patented, and in several cases
are more expensive in Brazil than in other developing
countries. Brazil’s Health Ministry still produces seven ARVs
introduced before 1997. Since 2001, the Health Ministry has
threatened to issue compulsory licenses in order to produce
additional ARVs locally. Under WTO rules, a compulsory
license allows governments to produce or to grant a third-
party authority to produce a drug without consent of the
patent holder in cases of national public health emergency,
among other limited circumstances [12,14]. Brazil’s threats to
issue compulsory licenses have attracted international atten-
tion about ARV prices, prompted a trade dispute with the
United States, and induced price negotiations with multina-
tional pharmaceutical companies for ﬁve patented ARVs
[15,16]. Together, Brazil’s policies of providing universal
access to treatment, producing generic ARVs, and negotiating
prices for patented drugs have been referred to as the
‘‘Brazilian model’’ for AIDS treatment [17]. In May 2007,
Brazil issued its ﬁrst compulsory license for an ARV. Under
its terms, Brazil imports generic efavirenz from drug
companies other than the patent holder Merck and Company
(hereafter Merck) [18]. The recent issuance of the compulsory
license for efavirenz suggests that Brazil’s AIDS treatment
model continues to evolve.
Brazil’s treatment guidelines generally include more ARVs
than those issued by other developing countries. The variety
of therapeutic options in use in Brazil reﬂects a combination
of clinical and social factors. Clinical factors include the
emergence and transmission of resistant HIV strains [19–21];
adverse events and side effects stemming from long-term
AIDS treatment [22,23]; complex case management of AIDS
coinfections such as hepatitis C and tuberculosis; and
complications related to drug dependence and psychiatric
disorders [24–26]. Social factors include pressure from civil
society groups and AIDS patients to provide the newest ARVs
and judicial decisions that stipulate that a constitutional right
to health care includes access to new ARVs [27]. For these
reasons, and the clear therapeutic and practical beneﬁts of
the new ARVs available in the international marketplace,
Brazil has integrated new ARVs such as lopinavir–ritonavir
(lopinavir/r), atazanavir, tenofovir, and enfuvirtide into
treatment guidelines; purchase quantities of each of these
patented drugs have increased signiﬁcantly over time.
Recent reports have described aggregate-level cost trends
in Brazil, noting in particular a sharp increase in total costs
per treated patient between 2004 and 2005 [16,28]. In this
study, we aim to unpack these overall trends by examining
expenditure information disaggregated by speciﬁc drugs, in
combination with information on evolving drug prices over
time. We expand on a recent study examining HAART cost
trends in Brazil [29] in several ways. First, we examine the
clinical factors contributing to Brazil’s rising HAART costs.
Second, we quantify the economic consequences of Brazil’s
policies of producing generic drugs locally and negotiating
price reductions for patented drugs. Third, we investigate the
relative contributions of changes in quantities and prices of
speciﬁc drugs to overall cost trends. Finally, we quantify how
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alternative assumptions.
Methods
Overview
For the purposes of this paper, we use the term ‘‘cost’’ to
refer to total aggregate expenditure on one or more ARVs
and ‘‘price’’ to refer to the per-pill or annual per-patient
purchase price of a drug.
We analyzed drug prices from various sources (see ‘‘Data,’’
below) for the years 2001 to 2005 for each of the drugs in
Brazil’s therapeutic guidelines for adults [30]. These represent
the most recent years for which accurate, detailed cost and
price data were available. Pediatric drugs were excluded from
this analysis because they are used with small numbers of
patients and represent a small fraction of total expenditures.
Generic names for ARVs are used for ease of international
comparison. Pharmaceutical companies often offer tiered
prices for low-, middle-, and high-income countries, but in
some cases offer only two price tiers for low-income and ‘‘all
other’’ countries. Brazil falls into the middle-income category
when three tiers are listed and the ‘‘all other’’ category when
two tiers are listed.
We estimated changes in the purchase quantities for each
speciﬁc drug during this period based on reports of annual,
drug-speciﬁc costs, combined with prices in Brazil for
corresponding years. Using a series of counterfactual
analyses, we decomposed cost trends into the components
attributable to price and quantity changes. With these
models, we estimated both excess costs and cost savings
related to Brazilian prices for generic and patented drugs.
Data
Brazil’s National STD and AIDS Program provided ofﬁcial
data on drug costs and prices for each ARV from 2001 to 2006
(AIDS Care and Treatment Department of the National STD
and AIDS Program of Brazil, personal communications). For
international comparisons, historical price data were com-
piled from a range of sources, including Doctors Without
Borders’ (Me ´decins Sans Frontie `res, MSF) pricing guides for
each year from 2001 to 2006 [2,31–35]; the Clinton
Foundation’s Procurement Consortium August 2006 ARV
price list [36]; and WHO’s August 2006 Global Price
Reporting Mechanism Report [37], which reports on ARV
prices procured for numerous countries through UNICEF,
the International Dispensary Association, the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and other leading
nonproﬁt organizations that procure ARVs. Global prices for
Bristol Meyers Squibb’s atazanavir and Roche’s enfuvirtide
were not available from these sources and were requested but
not provided by innovator companies. The 2007 prices for
Abbott Laboratories’ (hereafter Abbott) lopinavir/r were
obtained from Abbott’s Web site [38].
The Brazilian AIDS Program provided drug prices in
nominal US dollars. We ﬁrst adjusted for inﬂation by
converting all drug prices into 2005 US dollars using the
gross domestic product deﬂator series from the United States
Department of Commerce [39]. We then converted per-pill
prices to per patient per year (PPPY) prices based on clinical
dosing guidelines and rounded up to the nearest dollar.
Drug costs were provided in Brazilian reals. Cost data were
converted to US dollars using average annual exchange rates
according to the United States Federal Reserve Bank’s
historical records [40]. All cost data were then converted to
2005 US dollars using gross domestic product deﬂators.
Tariffs, freight, and insurance generally account for 3%–
15% increases over drug list prices [35]. The data we collected
on prices reﬂect these charges to varying degrees. Brazil’s
prices do not include any shipping, insurance, or government
taxes. WHO prices include transactions for ARVs during
2005; do not include taxes, tariffs, or freight charges; are
weighted for volume; and do not include outliers or
donations [37]. Clinton Foundation prices include shipping
and insurance charges. MSF’s generic prices and prices for
patented lopinavir/r, ritonavir, saquinavir, and tenofovir do
not include transport, freight, and insurance charges. Other
MSF prices reﬂect these charges [32].
Analysis
Price comparisons. To compare drug prices in Brazil to
those in other middle and low-income countries, we
examined Brazil’s 2006 PPPY prices alongside prices reported
by the 2006 WHO Price Reporting Mechanism, the Clinton
Foundation and MSF. Prices for patented ARVs in Brazil
reﬂect price negotiations that have taken place since 1998.
Reported percentage price declines for efavirenz and
nelﬁnavir are based on the price differences between the
year the drug was launched in Brazil and 2006 prices.
Reported percentage price declines for lopinavir/r, atazana-
vir, and tenofovir are based on the initial price offered by the
pharmaceutical company prior to the drug’s launch in Brazil
and 2006 prices. To constrain price comparisons to include
only those drugs meeting international quality and efﬁcacy
standards, whenever possible we restricted our analysis to
drugs that had been approved by either the WHO Prequa-
liﬁcation System or the US Food and Drug Administration.
Both agencies require bioequivalence testing and good
manufacturing, laboratory, and clinical practices [41,42]. To
make price comparisons for the last year for which data were
available in Brazil, we ended our comparative price analysis
in 2006.
Trends in HAART costs. We analyzed HAART cost trends
from 2001 to 2005 using annual costs for each drug in Brazil’s
treatment guidelines. We computed yearly ratios of total ARV
Figure 1. Patients Receiving HAART in Brazil, 1997–2005
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305.g001
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2005. Despite volatility in intra-year exchange rates during
the period 2001–2005, we used average exchange rates in each
year for clarity of presentation. To quantify the impact of
exchange rate volatility on our estimates, we report costs and
ranges about these costs based on the highest and lowest
exchange rates for each year.
Contributions of changes in drug prices and quantities to
cost trends. To disaggregate the effects of changes in drug
prices and quantities on costs, we ﬁrst present a graphical
analysis of the drug-speciﬁc prices and purchase quantities in
each year from 2001 to 2005. The number of daily doses for
each drug purchased in each year is computed by dividing the
drug-speciﬁc costs in a given year by the price per dose in
that year. For ease of presentation, we grouped generics other
than zidovudine–lamivudine (AZT/3TC) into one category,
AZT/3TC into another category, and patented drugs whose
prices were not negotiated into another. For the ﬁrst and
third groups, we present the volume-weighted average daily
price.
Next we use a series of counterfactual analyses to examine
the contributions of changes in drug prices and purchase
quantities to trends in overall costs and to compute cost
savings and excess costs relating to price changes for speciﬁc
drugs. In our ﬁrst counterfactual scenario, we partitioned
changes in total costs into the contributions of quantity
changes and price changes by estimating total costs assuming
the quantities of all drugs remained constant at their 2001
levels (or at the same level as in the year of introduction for
those drugs entering treatment guidelines after 2001), but
drug-speciﬁc prices changed as observed.
In a second counterfactual analysis, we computed the cost
savings associated with price reductions for patented drugs in
Brazil. In this scenario, drug quantities change as reported
between 2001 and 2005, but the prices for patented ARVs
remain constant at their 2001 levels over this period.
Finally, we modeled a third counterfactual scenario to
estimate the excess costs of higher prices for generics in
Brazil as compared to the lowest prices on the international
market. In this counterfactual, we estimated the trends in
total costs that would be expected if quantities of all drugs
changed between 2001 and 2005 as observed but the generic
prices in Brazil matched the lowest observed values on the
international market. In this analysis, we only considered
prices for prequaliﬁed drugs as reported by MSF. For
example, although generic didanosine was available more
cheaply outside Brazil, we did not include it in our analysis
because it had not been prequaliﬁed by the US Food and
Drug Administration or WHO.
Results
Price Comparisons
Brazil’s 2006 prices for generic ARVs (including AZT/3TC)
were higher than prices reported to the Global Price
Reporting Mechanism and MSF and higher than prices
enjoyed by countries in the Clinton Foundation Procurement
Consortium. Prices for some generics in Brazil were two to
four times higher than reported prices in other developing
countries (Table 1).
Prices PPPY for patented ARVs efavirenz and lopinavir/r
were lower in Brazil than in other middle-income countries
(Table 1). Brazil’s 2006 price of US$1,380 for Abbott’s
lopinavir/r was 72% lower than prices for this drug in other
middle-income countries reported to WHO. However, in
April and July 2007, Abbott offered price reductions to 40
more low- and middle-income countries, which resulted in
lower global prices for lopinavir/r in Brazil and elsewhere
[38,43]. Brazil’s US$580 PPPY efavirenz price was lower than
Merck’s US$697 price for middle-income countries with
similar HIV prevalence rates, but higher than generic
competitors and the average price of other middle-income
countries. Even after the most recent price negotiation in
Brazil with Gilead Sciences, the US$1,327 PPPY price of
tenofovir was higher than the US$1,186 average middle-
income country price reported to the WHO.
Trends in HAART Costs
Total HAART costs in Brazil declined from US$204 million
in 2001 to US$162 million in 2003, before rising by around
20% in 2004 and then more than doubling in 2005 to US$414
million. Patented ARVs accounted for between 60% and 70%
of total costs from 2001 to 2003 but then jumped to 80% of
total costs in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 2). The substantial rise in
total costs between 2004 and 2005 contrasts with the
relatively steady yearly rise in patient numbers over this
period (Figure 1). Consistent with previous reports [16,28] we
found that the ratio of total costs to number of treated
patients declined from US$1,945 in 2001 to US$1,220 in 2003
and then more than doubled to US$2,577 in 2005 (Figure 3).
Assuming all drugs were consumed in the year of purchase,
this ratio would be interpreted as the average treatment cost
per person per year. In actuality, potential deviations from
this perfect alignment of purchase and consumption times
require that this ratio be interpreted cautiously. Though cost
estimates varied slightly with intra-year exchange rates,
trends were generally robust to exchange rate volatility.
Disaggregating costs by drug categories sheds some light on
the drivers of broad cost trends. Generics declined as a share
of total HAART cost from 2001 to 2005; they accounted for
42% of costs in 2001 (US$86 million) but only 20% (US$84
million) by 2005. Generic costs excluding AZT/3TC decreased
from 34% of costs (US$70 million) in 2001 to 22% of costs
(US$44 million) in 2005 (Figure 2). The declining relative
contribution of generics is consistent with the substitution of
more costly alternatives as therapeutic guidelines evolved
over time. Indinavir, didanosine, and nevirapine were
replaced by newer, more costly, patented ﬁrst-line therapies
such as lopinavir/r, atazanavir, tenofovir, and efavirenz. A
ﬁxed-dose combination of AZT/3TC replaced separate doses
of the two drugs. Similarly, the patented protease inhibitors
saquinavir and nelﬁnavir were replaced by more expensive
but clinically preferable lopinavir/r and atazanavir in ﬁrst-
and second-line regimens [30,44]. However, we note that in
absolute terms, costs associated with all categories of drugs
actually increased between 2004 and 2005, and by a factor of
two or more in some cases. These increases in all categories
suggest that the sharp rise in total costs in 2005 is not
explained simply by substitution of more expensive patented
and generic drugs for less-expensive alternatives.
Six ARVs with the greatest increases in costs over this
period—enfuvirtide, AZT/3TC, tenofovir, efavirenz, atazana-
vir, and lopinavir/r—accounted for a US$284 million total
increase from 2001 to 2005. Spending on these six drugs more
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Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazilthan offset decreased spending on other ARVs during this
period. Figure 4 displays the absolute and percentage growth
of each of these six drugs’ contributions to total costs.
Contributions of Changes in Drug Price and Patient
Volume to Cost Trends
The PPPY prices for several patented medicines, including
efavirenz, nelﬁnavir, tenofovir, and lopinavir 133 mg with
ritonavir 33 mg (one of two formulations of lopinavir/r used
in Brazil during the period of analysis) declined over 50%
from 2001 to 2005 (Table 2).
Trends in total costs may be decomposed into the fraction
of the change attributable to changing drug prices and the
fraction attributable to changing purchase quantities. Figure
5 offers a graphical illustration of the relative importance of
prices and quantities to observed cost changes for each ARV
from 2001 to 2005. Reinforcing the ﬁndings from analysis of
total costs, we note that the sharp increase in the number of
purchased doses in 2005 appears inconsistent with the rise
that would be expected simply from patient scale-up, even
allowing that some existing patients may have moved over
time to regimens containing greater numbers of drugs.
For some drugs, such as AZT/3TC, changes in price were
modest while quantities rose dramatically. For others, such as
nelﬁnavir, both price and quantity declined over the period
of analysis. For efavirenz and lopinavir/r, major price
reductions were more than offset by substantial increases in
volume from 2001 to 2005, and in particular from 2004 to
2005, thereby increasing the contributions of these drugs to
overall costs. Tenofovir and atazanavir prices have declined
moderately since they were added to treatment guidelines in
2003, but their volume rose rapidly from 2004 to 2005,
contributing to substantial increases in total costs. Enfuvir-
tide prices have not been negotiated under the threat of
issuing a compulsory license and its costs are relatively high
despite limited quantities.
Price reductions and declining quantities of Roche’s
nelﬁnavir accounted for a US$37 million decline in total
cost 2001–2003 (Figures 4 and 5). Total costs for locally
produced generic indinavir and nevirapine also decreased by
US$25 million from 2001 to 2003 as per-pill prices decreased
40% for indinavir and 58% for nevirapine (Figures 4 and 5).
Other locally produced generics also accounted for an US$18
million decline in total costs because of falling per-pill
generic prices. Together, these speciﬁc price and quantity
reductions were the major drivers of observed declines in
total costs from 2001 to 2003. Cost savings for patented
nelﬁnavir and locally produced indinavir, nevirapine, and
other generics offset cost increases for other drugs during the
same time period.
In contrast to patented drugs whose prices have declined
over time, per-pill prices for AZT/3TC and other locally
produced generics have increased since 2003. The per-pill
price of AZT/3TC decreased from US$0.50 in 2001 to US$0.42
in 2003 but then increased to US$0.56 in 2005. Similarly, the
volume-weighted average price of other locally produced
generics decreased from US$0.38 in 2001 to US$0.28 in 2003
but increased to US$0.37 in 2005 (Figure 5). Even after
controlling for variation in exchange rates, per-pill generic
drug prices still increased approximately 6%–7% each year
between 2001 and 2004. From 2004 to 2005, less than 1% of
the rising cost of per-pill generic prices was attributable to
exchange rate variation.
Counterfactual Analyses
The change in total costs between 2001 and 2005 is
attributable almost entirely to changes in drug purchase
quantities over this period. If quantities had remained
constant between 2001 and 2005, total annual costs would
have increased by only US$7 million between 2001 and 2005,
and the cost in 2005 would have been US$203 million lower
than the observed total, or approximately half as high (Figure
6A).
We estimate that the total cost savings resulting from price
reductions for patented drugs was approximately US$1.2
billion from 2001 to 2005. Had patented drug prices
remained constant over time, total drug costs would have
been US$406 million rather than US$204 million in 2001 and
would have reached US$952 million by 2005, more than twice
as high as the observed 2005 total cost of US$414 million
(Figure 6B). These estimated savings exceed Brazil’s actual
total ARV costs over this period.
We found, in contrast, that higher prices for generics in
Brazil compared to the lowest prices on the international
market produced a total excess cost of approximately US$110
million over this period, including an excess of US$47 million
in 2005 alone. If Brazil had enjoyed the lowest prices for
generics, total costs would have been US$189 million rather
than US$204 million in 2001 and US$367 million rather than
US$414 in 2005 (Figure 6C). In 2005, the bulk of savings
would have stemmed from AZT/3TC, which accounted for
only US$4 million (26%) of the hypothetical cost differential
in 2001 but US$23 million (48%) in 2005.
Discussion
Brazil’s rapid progress in procuring and distributing the
most modern ARVs to 180,000 AIDS patients is remarkable
and has led to sustained improved health outcomes. We
found that price reductions following negotiations with
multinational pharmaceutical companies averted nearly half
Figure 2. Total ARV Costs in Brazil, 2001–2005
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305.g002
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Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazilof the potential costs in the absence of these reductions, but
that higher prices for generic drugs in Brazil forfeited
another 10% in potential additional savings.
Total Costs
Brazil’s price negotiations with multinational pharmaceut-
ical companies resulted in sustained price reductions for ﬁve
patented ARVs from 2001 to 2005. Nonetheless, between 2003
and 2005, overall HAART costs increased by a factor of 2.5.
While the total number of patients receiving HAART only
increased by 14,000, or 8%, from 2004 to 2005, total costs
more than doubled in this single-year interval alone. If we
assumed that all ARVs purchased in a given year were
consumed by patients treated during that year, the simple
ratios of total costs to numbers of patients would imply a
substantial jump in average per-patient drug expenditures
[16,28,45]. However, our more detailed analyses caution
against interpreting the 2005 rise in this way. By using data
on drug-speciﬁc prices and costs to estimate purchase
quantities of particular ARVs over time, we found that the
attributions that have been postulated previously—for
example, growing drug resistance [28]—are inadequate to
fully explain the sudden and sharp spike in expenditures in
2005.
Decreases in total and per-patient ARV costs from 2001 to
2003 accompanied price negotiations for nelﬁnavir and
declining per-pill prices for locally produced generics.
However, as the standard of care has improved, nelﬁnavir
and other locally produced generics have been replaced and
supplemented with newer, patented ARVs in ﬁrst-line treat-
ment guidelines [30,45]. Even though Brazil’s prices for the
four patented drugs driving cost increases declined precip-
itously, this reduction was more than offset by increased
purchase volumes of newer, patented ARVs and AZT/3TC, the
main causes of cost increases in Brazil. Tenofovir and
atazanavir were added to treatment guidelines in 2003 and
scaled up to increasing numbers of patients as they were
substituted for other drugs in 2004 and 2005. Similarly, in
2003 and 2004, lopinavir/r and efavirenz costs grew as they
were increasingly substituted for other drugs in ﬁrst-line and
second-line regimens. Enfuvirtide was added as a new
treatment option in 2005.
However, in disaggregating total costs by speciﬁc drugs,
and parsing price changes from estimated changes in
purchase volumes, we found that total costs and estimated
purchase quantities actually increased for all categories of
drugs between 2004 and 2005. Overall, we estimate that the
total volume of drug doses purchased in 2005 was more than
50% higher than the volume purchased in 2004. These ﬁgures
suggest that substitution of more expensive for less expensive
alternatives is insufﬁcient to explain the observed spike in
total costs in 2005; moreover, the magnitude of the increase
in total purchase volume remains difﬁcult to reconcile with
the increase in patient volume, even if some existing patients
added more drugs to their treatment regimens as they
developed resistance, experienced clinical failures or side
effects associated with long-term treatment, or as formerly
second-line therapies became ﬁrst-line therapies. It is
plausible that Brazil may have purchased more drugs in
2005 than in previous years in order to maintain adequate
drug stocks during price negotiations. However, without
more precise data or explanations about patient regimen
changes—which we have requested but to date have not
received from the Brazilian National STD and AIDS Program
(AIDS Care and Treatment Department of the National STD
and AIDS Program of Brazil, personal communications)
deﬁnitive statements about the causes of the rise in costs in
2005 would be speculative.
Cost Increases Reflect Therapeutic and Pragmatic
Improvements
Though generally more expensive than previous ﬁrst- and
second-line drugs, the six ARVs responsible for total cost
increases (enfuvirtide, AZT/3TC, tenofovir, efavirenz, ataza-
navir, and lopinavir/r) offer therapeutic beneﬁts and prag-
matic advantages over drugs included in Brazil’s previous
treatment guidelines. Newer ARVs often require fewer pills,
may be effective in treatment-naı ¨ve and treatment-experi-
enced patients, and tend to have fewer or different side
effects [46–57]. For example, the 600 mg single-pill dosing of
efavirenz is more convenient than the former 200 mg
formulation and is US$120 cheaper PPPY. Similarly, the
generic AZT/3TC ﬁxed-dose combination is expected to
enhance patient adherence to HAART by reducing pill
volume [58–60]. At a price of US$17,301 PPPY, Roche/
Trimeris’ injectable entry inhibitor enfuvirtide is perhaps
the most controversial drug in Brazil’s treatment guidelines,
but presents options for salvage therapy in highly treatment-
experienced AIDS patients for whom other treatment
options have failed [57].
The Prices of Generics and Alternative Scenarios
In contrast with the international marketplace, where the
prices of all generic ARVs have fallen substantially in recent
years [31–35], Brazil’s generic ARV prices have risen since
2003. With available information, it remains unclear why
Brazil’s prices are higher than generics that meet global drug
quality standards produced in other countries.
A recent study attributed 75% of the cost of ARV
production in Brazil and elsewhere to active pharmaceutical
ingredients (APIs) and 25% to indirect costs [61]. Since
Brazil’s public drug production facilities only formulate
Figure 3. Ratio of Total Annual ARV Costs in US Dollars to Numbers of
Patients on Treatment
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305.g003
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Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazildrugs, do not conduct chemical synthesis to produce APIs,
and import most APIs from China and India (Executive
Ofﬁce, Farmanguinhos Public Drug Production Facility,
personal communications), the wide pricing differentials
observed between generics manufactured in Brazil and else-
where are surprising. The aforementioned article on HAART
costs in Brazil attributes rising costs to ‘‘lack of investment in
local production’’ but does not elaborate further [29]. Though
requested, explanations about the causes of this trend were
not clariﬁed in interviews and other correspondence with
several public ofﬁcials who oversee drug policy and local drug
production in Brazil (Executive Ofﬁce, Farmanguinhos Public
Drug Production Facility, Executive Ofﬁce, Department of the
National STD and AIDS Program of Brazil, personal commu-
nications). The former director of a public drug factory
attributes the rising cost of generics to Brazil’s public bidding
process, which requires that the Health Ministry purchase the
least expensive APIs, which do not always meet requisite
quality standards. Low-quality or ‘‘impure’’ APIs must be
replaced by higher-quality APIs, which ultimately raises total
production costs. A recent newspaper article echoes this
concern, but neither source clariﬁes why this trend emerged
only recently (Farmanguinhos Public Drug Production Fa-
cility, personal communications) [62,71].
Irrespective of the cause of this trend in rising costs, lower
international ARV prices suggest that other generic pro-
ducers may have discovered important ways to lower either
production or API costs, and that exploring the potential for
cost savings for locally produced generics is both worthwhile
and a potential avenue for new research. The potential
inefﬁciency of local generic production is nevertheless
dwarfed by Brazil’s savings in price reductions for patented
medicines. When Brazil’s broader model is considered,
accounting for both the relatively more costly locally
produced generics and Brazil’s reduced costs from price
negotiations, Brazil still realized over US$1 billion in cost
savings from 2001 to 2005.
Brazil’s recent decision to issue a compulsory license and
import generic efavirenz may signal an acknowledgement
that other generic drug companies can now produce ARVs at
much lower costs than Brazil’s Health Ministry. However,
Brazil might lose its ability to negotiate steep price reductions
for patented ARVs if the Health Ministry stops producing
generics. On the other hand, given the much lower prices
elsewhere, Brazil may ultimately enjoy lower prices for
patented ARVs by issuing compulsory licenses to import
select drugs from generic pharmaceutical companies than by
threatening to issue compulsory licenses to induce price
reductions from innovator companies.
Global Competition Lowers Brazil’s Prices
Brazil generally has limited power to threaten to issue
compulsory licenses and negotiate prices for drugs when no
generics or APIs are available; often no generic competitors
exist for several years after Brazil integrates the newest ARVs
into treatment guidelines. Brazil’s negotiations have there-
fore been most successful for ARVs for which generic
competition is emerging, including lopinavir/r, efavirenz,
and tenofovir, and less so for atazanavir, which does not yet
have a WHO-prequaliﬁed generic competitor. Two recent
examples highlight how generic competition has inﬂuenced
global prices with direct effects on Brazil. First, in May 2006
Indian generic manufacturer Cipla launched a price of
US$700 PPPY for generic tenofovir, which coincided with
both Gilead’s 50% price reduction for tenofovir in Brazil and
Gilead’s announcement that it would issue voluntary licenses
to generic manufacturers to produce tenofovir [63]. (Under
WTO trade rules, under voluntary license terms the patent
holder grants third parties the right to produce drugs for a
negotiated royalty fee [12,14].) Second, emerging competition
Figure 4. Total Annual Cost by Drug (Left) and Proportion of All Annual Drug Costs (Right)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305.g004
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Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazilalso likely prompted Abbott’s seven-year US$920 PPPY
contract with Brazil for heat-stable lopinavir/r in 2005 and
Abbott’s 2007 decision to further lower lopinavir/r prices for
40 more low- and middle-income countries, including Brazil
[38,64,65].
Addressing Rising HAART Costs in Brazil
Brazil has achieved sustained reduced prices for several of
the drugs for which generic APIs are available. Negotiating
prices rather than issuing compulsory licenses has likely
helped Brazil avoid further trade conﬂicts with the US and
the WTO. The extent to which Brazil’s recent decision to
issue compulsory licenses will lower drug prices in Brazil may
depend on whether Brazil produces the drugs or imports
cheaper generics. If Brazil opts to produce its own generic
versions of patented medicines and the cost of APIs declines
with increased global demand and economies of scale, prices
of select ARVs might decline further. However, given the
observed rising costs of locally produced generics, it is
unclear that issuing a compulsory license to produce generics
locally would lower prices more than negotiating; Brazil’s
negotiated prices for patented drugs have historically been
lower than prices for the same drugs in other middle-income
countries, while Brazil’s prices for locally produced generics
have been higher. On the other hand, Brazil might enjoy
signiﬁcant cost savings if the Health Ministry imports the
least-expensive generic ARVs available in the global market-
place. Whether Brazil imports or produces generic versions
of patented medicines, Brazil’s decision to issue compulsory
licenses may have complex geopolitical consequences.
Despite rising costs, HAART expenditure as a percentage
of total health expenditure represented a steady 2% of total
annual health spending in Brazil from 2001 to 2005 [66].
Moreover, because overall public drug expenditure increased
dramatically from 2001 to 2005 as a result of new public drug
programs, HAART costs declined from 50% to 36% of total
drug expenditure. These ﬁndings suggest that rising total
HAART costs have not imperiled other public health
spending. However, HAART costs dwarf drug spending for
any one other disease, including those that account for a
greater disease burden than HIV/AIDS in Brazil [66,67]. If
HAART costs continue to increase rapidly, growth in HAART
spending may eventually outpace growth in overall public
health spending, which could detrimentally impact other
public health programs.
Brazil is bound by law to provide drugs for all people living
with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in need of treatment [27,68].
Brazil’s courts have consistently interpreted this mandate
liberally. As a result, and because of strong activist and Health
Ministry support for Brazil’s AIDS treatment policies, it is
unlikely that Brazil will ration HAART or introduce means-
testing for HIV/AIDS treatment, even if costs continue to
increase. In light of these political realities and the ﬁndings
we present, unless other companies dramatically lower their
global ARV prices, Brazil’s total HAART costs will likely rise
as Brazil scales up treatment.
Global Implications of Brazil’s Model
Most developing countries enjoy much lower prices for the
generic drugs Brazil produces locally; generic drug prices are
therefore unlikely to contribute to rising costs to the same
degree in other places as they have in Brazil. Though Brazil’s
initial prices for the newest ARVs may be higher than prices
other developing countries ultimately enjoy for the same
drugs, by threatening to issue or issuing compulsory licenses
and producing drugs locally, Brazil has historically enjoyed
Table 2. Price Declines for Select Patented ARVs in Brazil, PPPY, US$
Drug 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Decline in PPPY
Price from First
Offer Price
Decline in PPPY
Price from First
Launch Price
Atazanavir 150 mg —————1 0 ,074;
2,373
a
2,373 2,190 — 78% 8%
Atazanavir 200 mg —————1 0 ,074;
2,373
a
2,373 2,285 — 77% 4%
Efavirenz 200 mg — 2,540 2,540 920 920 — — — — 77%
b 77%
b
Efavirenz 600 mg
b ————— 7 6 7 ;
577
577 577 —
Nelfinavir 250 mg 5,585 5,329 2,482 3,942;
3,650
1,935 1,898 1,716 — — 69% 69%
Lopinavir 133 mg þ
ritonavir 33 mg
———6 , 5 0 4 ;
4,139
3,504 3,285 2,847 2,562;
1,380
— 84% 75%
Lopinavir 200 mg þ
ritonavir 50 mg
c
—————— ——1 , 0 2 2
Tenofovir 300 mg ————— 5 , 0 3 7 ;
3,296;
2,905
d
2,803 2,657 1,387 72% 58%
Cells with two entries reflect two ARV purchase prices for that year.
Source: AIDS Care and Treatment Department of the National STD and AIDS Program of Brazil (personal communications).
—, No negotiation that year because drug not in guidelines or price remained stable.
aReflects initial negotiation price and first purchase price.
bOne daily dose of efavirenz 600 mg replaced three pills of efavirenz 200 mg.
cHeat-stable formulation.
dReflects initial negotiation price, first purchase price, and second purchase price.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305.t002
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Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazillower prices for some ARVs than many other middle-income
countries. While Brazil’s model has been highly effective in
lowering prices for patented ARVs, middle-income countries
without domestic pharmaceutical industries or public drug
production capacity have less power than Brazil to negotiate
prices for patented drugs and may choose not to take the
international political risks associated with issuing compul-
sory licenses. Moreover, even if other middle-income coun-
tries opt to issue compulsory licenses, importing generics may
be cheaper and more feasible than producing drugs locally.
Our cost ﬁndings may be less relevant to low-income
countries, which typically enjoy the lowest global prices for
patented ARVs but often do not integrate the most costly
ARVs into treatment guidelines.
Brazil’s model has affected ARV prices around the globe.
First, Brazil’s model set an important precedent for price
negotiations and tiered pricing schemes for other developing
countries. Second, Brazil’s treatment policies have helped
create a market for generic ARVs; in turn, generic competi-
tion has facilitated Brazil’s price negotiations and lowered
global ARV prices. Third, other countries have also used
compulsory licenses in order to import drugs and reduce
drug prices. For example, Thailand issued compulsory
licenses for several antiretroviral and cardiovascular drugs
in 2006 and 2007, including lopinavir/r and efavirenz, among
others [65]. Thailand’s decision to issue compulsory licenses,
in turn, fostered greater transparency about global ARV
prices and set a new precedent for middle-income countries.
Shortly after Thailand issued compulsory licenses, Brazil
issued its ﬁrst compulsory license for Merck’s efavirenz [18].
Additionally, in April 2007, Abbott further lowered its prices
for original and heat-stable lopinavir/r from US$2,200 to
US$1,000 PPPY in more than 40 lower middle-income and
low-income countries (including Brazil and Thailand) and to
US$500 for nine additional low-income countries outside
sub-Saharan Africa [38,43].
Study Limitations
We acknowledge several limitations to our study. First,
because we did not have patient, pill, and cost data for 1998
to 2001, when prices for nelﬁnavir and efavirenz dropped
considerably, we cannot estimate total cost savings from price
declines prior to 2001. Similarly, some drug prices declined
further after 2005, the last year for which cost data were
available in Brazil. This study therefore could not assess the
impact of 2006 and 2007 price declines on cost trends.
Second, because prices are negotiated and ARVs are usually
purchased up to six months prior to their consumption, there
is not always a perfect match in reported annual costs and the
number of patients taking each drug in a given year. The
sharp spike noted above in total costs in 2005, which greatly
exceeds the relative rise in patient numbers and might not be
fully explained by individual regimen changes, may be due in
part to this distortion in the timing of purchases relative to
consumption. Further, drug prices from different sources
vary slightly with costs of freight, shipping, taxes, and
insurance. Because of data limitations and poor reporting
on switches from ﬁrst- to second- and third-line treatment,
we were also unable to decompose our estimates of drug
Figure 5. Contributions of Drug Price and Purchase Quantities to Total Cost, 2001–2005
The overall contribution of a particular drug to total costs in a given year is represented by the area of the rectangle that represents that drug. Changes
in quantities for a particular drug appear as changes in the height of the rectangle. Changes in the price per daily dose of each ARV appear as changes
in the width of the bars. The values associated with the width of the bars are reflected in the legend. The overall height of the bars in each year reflects
the estimated total number of doses purchased in that year.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040305.g005
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Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazilquantities attributable to patient volume versus drug mix.
This article’s ﬁndings therefore represent the most precise
estimates currently available to our knowledge, rather than
empirical absolutes.
Conclusion
Brazil’s price negotiations have been most effective in
lowering costs for drugs in which generic competition has
emerged. Despite declining patented ARV prices, Brazil’s
total HAART costs more than doubled since 2004. Cost
increases reﬂect, in part, the progression of Brazil’s AIDS
epidemic ten years after introduction of free and universal
access to HAART: more people began treatment, the stand-
ard of care evolved, and new drugs became available for both
treatment-naı ¨ve and treatment-experienced patients. How-
ever, the incongruous rise in costs from 2004 to 2005
warrants further scrutiny. Brazil faces rising costs for many
locally produced generic ARVs, particularly AZT/3TC. Brazil’s
AIDS treatment model nevertheless resulted in sustained
lower prices for four of the six ARVs consuming the largest
percentage of Brazil’s HAART budget, saving Brazil over
US$1 billion from 2001 to 2005.
The generalizability of these ﬁndings to other countries will
depend on the strength of their health systems, treatment
guidelines, intellectual property regimes, epidemiological
proﬁles, approaches to scaling up AIDS treatment, differing
capacities for local drug production, and on global drug
prices, all of which continue to evolve. These ﬁndings
nevertheless provide important lessons for other developing
countries that aim to provide universal access to HAART.
New therapeutically superior ARVs will become increasingly
important components of global AIDS treatment guidelines
as drug-resistant strains of HIV emerge in other low- and
middle-income countries, patients develop side effects
associated with long-term HAART, AIDS case management
becomes more complex because of coinfections, and patients
move from ﬁrst- to second- and third-line treatment. As other
middle- and low-income countries grapple with the chal-
lenges Brazil currently faces, they will have fewer options to
directly negotiate ARV prices but may enjoy the fruits of
generic ARV competition.
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Antiretroviral Drug Costs in BrazilEditors’ Summary
Background. Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) has killed 29
million people since the first case occurred in 1981 and an estimated 40
million people live with HIV/AIDS today. AIDS is caused by the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which destroys the immune system.
Infected individuals are consequently very susceptible to other
infections. Early in the AIDS epidemic, most HIV-positive individuals
died within a few years of becoming infected. Then, in 1996, highly
active antiretroviral therapy (HAART)—a cocktail of antiretroviral drugs
(ARVs)—was developed. For people who could afford HAART (which
holds HIV infections in check), AIDS became a chronic disease. People
who start HAART must keep taking it or their illness will progress.
Unfortunately, few people in low- and middle-income countries could
afford these expensive drugs. In 2001, ARV prices fell in developing
countries as AIDS activists and developing country governments
challenged pharmaceutical companies about ARV prices, pharmaceutical
companies set tiered prices for the low- and middle-income countries
and more generic (inexpensive copies of brand-named drugs) ARVs
became available. In 2003, the lack of access to HIV/AIDS treatment was
declared a global health emergency. Governments, international
organizations, and funding bodies began to set targets and provide
funds to increase access to HAART in developing countries. By 2007, over
2 million people in low- and middle-income countries had access to
HAART, but another 5 million remain in urgent need of drugs for
treatment.
Why Was This Study Done? In 1995, many countries in the world signed
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property (TRIPS) agreement, which requires countries to acknowl-
edge intellectual property rights for many products, including
pharmaceuticals. In 1996, Brazil became the first developing country to
commit to and implement policies to provide free and universal access
to HAART. Since then, Brazil’s successful AIDS treatment program has
become a model for the developing world, and 180,000 Brazilians were
receiving HAART at the end of 2006. However, as a WTO member that
signed on to the TRIPS agreement, Brazil was required to recognize the
intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical companies’ patented ARVs.
As Brazil scaled up treatment in the late 1990s, the cost of treating AIDS
patients rose quickly and the country took controversial public policy
steps to reduce the cost of providing HAART to people living with HIV/
AIDS. Brazil produces several non-patented ARVs locally, and since 2001
has challenged multinational pharmaceutical companies about the
prices of patented ARVs. To induce price reductions for patented ARVs,
Brazil has threatened to issue compulsory licenses (which under WTO
terms allow countries facing a health emergency to produce patented
drugs without consent of the company holding the patent). Brazil also
recently issued a compulsory license for one ARV.
Although world leaders have set a target of universal access to HAART
by 2010, little is known about the long-term costs of AIDS treatment in
developing countries. In this study, the researchers have investigated
how and why the costs of ARVs changed in Brazil between 2001 and
2005 and discuss the relevance of the Brazilian model for AIDS treatment
for other resource-limited settings.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers analyzed the
prices for each ARV recommended in Brazil’s therapeutic guidelines for
adults and estimated the changes in purchase quantities for each
between 2001 and 2005. These changes likely stem from the growing
number of options in Brazil’s treatment guidelines, the steadily rising
number of patients commencing treatment, and patients’ shifts to
second- and third-line treatments when their HIV infection became
resistant to first-line drugs or they developed side effects. The
researchers report that the generic drugs produced in Brazil were
generally more expensive than similar drugs made elsewhere, but Brazil’s
negotiated drug prices for many patented ARVs were lower than
elsewhere. Overall, total annual drug expenditure on ARVs doubled
between 2001 and 2005, reaching US$414 million in 2005. Because many
drug prices fell sharply as a result of declining patented drug prices over
the study period, this increase was mainly attributable to increases in
drug quantities purchased. If these quantities had stayed constant, the
total annual cost would have increased by only $7 million, to $211
million. Conversely, without the decrease in the price of patented drugs,
Brazil would have spent $952 million annually by 2005. If Brazil had
enjoyed the lowest global prices for generic medicines, the total costs
per year in 2005 would have been $367 million, or nearly $50 million less
than the costs Brazil actually realized.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings tease out the many
factors—clinical, commercial, and political—that affected the total costs
of the Brazilian AIDS treatment program between 2001 and 2005.
Brazil’s ability to produce generic drugs facilitated Brazil’s price
negotiations for patented drugs. Although Brazil saved approximately
US$1 billion over the study period as a result of declining prices for
patented medicines, the cost of producing generic drugs locally has risen
while the prices for generic drugs have fallen elsewhere. Brazil’s recent
decision to import a generic ARV using a compulsory license suggests
that the Brazilian model for AIDS treatment continues to evolve.
Questions remain about the precise causes of year-to-year cost trends
in Brazil because, for example, the researchers did not have full data on
when patients switched from first-line to second- or third-line drugs. The
observed steep rise in costs from 2004 to 2005 in particular warrants
further analysis. In addition, the findings may not be generalizable to
countries with different policies on HIV/AIDS treatment, different access
to generic drugs, or different bargaining power with multinational drug
companies. Nevertheless, the trends this study highlights provide
important information about how AIDS treatment costs are likely to
evolve in other developing countries as efforts are made to provide
universal access to life-saving ARVs.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0040305.
  Information from the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases on HIV infection and AIDS
  Information from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
on global HIV/AIDS topics (in English and Spanish)
  HIV InSite, comprehensive and up-to-date information on all aspects of
HIV/AIDS from the University of California San Francisco
  Information from Avert, an international AIDS charity, on HIV and AIDS
in Brazil and on HIV/AIDS treatment and care, including universal
access to ARVs
  Progress towards universal access to HIV/AIDS treatment, the latest
report from the World Health Organization (available in several
languages)
  The National STD and AIDS Program of Brazil
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